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Carbon Market Negotiations Under The Paris Agreement

Posted By on December 4, 2020 in Uncategorized | 0 comments

If the market system was active around the world and the cost savings generated by carbon markets were reinvested in the fight against climate change – a big “if” given the slow pace of international progress in the fight against climate change, EDF analysts estimate that emissions reductions over the next 15 years “would increase from 77 [billion tonnes of CO2] to 147 billion tonnes of CO2 in a non-tradeable base scenario, in a comprehensive global exchange scenario. , an increase of 91%. Among the most important is Brazil, which has made it a central element in recent discussions on carbon markets, as Mr Forrister explains: conditional NPNPs proposed two emission reduction targets: low-level targets that countries could achieve on their own and more abrupt targets to achieve if CHARBON markets or other international mechanisms were part of the final agreement. The adoption of a replacement system in accordance with Article 6.4 could create the necessary conditions for countries to set more ambitious targets, since they would have to meet their targets at a lower cost. But as Carbon Market Watch explains, things are a little more complicated: these compromise options could be part of the haggling in discussions – for example, in exchange for stricter rules for the international carbon market, as De Leon of Costa Rica Carbon Brief says: Hector Pollitt, economist at Cambridge Econometrics, dismissed the idea that carbon pricing was the most cost-effective way to reduce emissions. At the “pre-COP” meeting in Costa Rica in October, a group of parties, including the EU, Costa Rica, Colombia, Senegal, New Zealand and AOSIS, met to define red lines which they said could not be exceeded if the integrity of the Paris agreement were to be preserved in the Article 6 negotiations. Many countries continue to insist that they will not accept an agreement authorizing old loans or double-counting of emissions reductions, as such an agreement would undermine the environmental integrity of future markets. These include the EU, Mexico, Switzerland, Costa Rica, New Zealand, which are part of the Environmental Integrity Group, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the Group of Least Developed Countries (LDCs). The political way to prevent this is infinitely complex – a complexity that is embodied in one of the main themes of this year`s UN climate negotiations in Madrid: international carbon markets. This highlights a reason for disagreement with Article 6.4, namely that cdM hosts did not have specific Kyoto emission reduction targets, meaning that economies cannot be “counted twice” towards more than one target. A corresponding option in the draft text relating to Article 6.2 indicates that the general requirements for the prevention of double counts already adopted under paragraph 77, point d), of the Paris Regulation would be “supecede[d] by the provisions of Article 6.

The statement against it is an attempt to reopen the debate. In Katowice, the proceeds of the draft Article 6.2 rules have not been resolved, suggesting that this was one of the most controversial issues in the negotiations. Since then, a longer list of options has been reintroduced in the most recent text. The Paris Agreement allows for the transfer of emission reductions between countries, but national climate strategies are not as uniform as the Kyoto Protocol ceilings. It is interesting to note that the Paris Agreement says that trade must promote sustainable development that appears to be a remnant of the days of differentiation.